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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN TEXT
DoD

U.S. Department of Defense

EMD

Emergency Management Division. Each state has an EMD as does the
Federal Emergency Management Agency

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

FOS

Full Operating Status

HSD

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

ICW

Intercoastal Waterway. Inland waterway system along Atlantic and Gulf
coasts

LASH

Lighter Aboard Ship. A merchant type ship where cargo is stored on barges
that can be landed in a non-port environment

Marad

Maritime Administration. Agency within U.S. Department of Transportation

MASH

Military Advanced Surgical Hospital

MSC

Military Sealift Command. A part of DoD Transportation Command

NDRF

National Defense Reserve Fleet

RO/RO*

Merchant type vessel where cargo is on wheeled vehicles or on trailers that
can be offloaded by tractors

ROPU

Reverse Osmosis Purification Unit

ROS

Reduced Operating Status. Designation for a Ready Reserve Force vessel not
fully crewed and one where a specific number of days would be required for
the vessel to ready for sea.

RRF

Ready Reserve Force. A part of the NDRF

SOCP

Ship Operations Cooperative Program

USWRP

U.S. Weather Research Program

*See Hurricane Relief From the Sea, pp. 13-14 for pictures of different classes of
RO/ROs with description of their cargo carrying capabilities.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In November 2005, the Strom Thurmond Institute published the results of its research
project “Hurricane Relief From the Sea.” This 25 page report was made available on the
Institute’s website (www.strom.clemson.edu). Hard copies were also distributed to
individuals and agencies presumed to have an interest in the concept.
The report was based on the premise that the relief from the sea concept, both in a
military and civilian context, is an historic fact, proven successful, with numerous
examples in the 20th and 21st centuries. [1]
Hurricane “Katrina,” which struck the U.S. Gulf coast on September 23, 2005, leaving in
its wake approximately 1,400 dead, tens of thousands homeless, and multi-billions of
dollars in property damage, proved beyond question the value of a relief from the sea
capability when a disaster occurs.
In the context of the “Katrina” response effort, the report, “Hurricane Relief From the
Sea,” poses the question: If it is granted that the unplanned, ad hoc, relief from the sea
effort was one of the very few success stories in the aftermath of “Katrina,” is it not fair
to ask how much more could be accomplished with a pre-planned response?
On January 27, 2006, the Thurmond Institute sponsored a conference in Charleston,
South Carolina to further examine the concept of relief from the sea. Invitations were
limited to those individuals who would play a key role in the planning and
implementation of a response from the sea initiative. Included were state Emergency
Management personnel, port operations officials, representatives from the Maritime
Administration (Marad), Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA),
Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the U.S. Coast Guard.
Presentations were made by the Maritime Administration, the Department of Defense
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, the South Carolina Port Authority, the
South Carolina Emergency Management Division, the Seafarers International Union, a
former Chief, Division of Maintenance and Repair, Maritime Administration, and a
former Center for Disease Control medical researcher.
Conclusions Reached at the 27 January 2006 Conference
*The concept of “Hurricane Relief From the Sea” should be expanded to include all
disasters, on all coasts, including terrorist attacks.
Comment: While the relief from the sea concept is generally applicable to the U.S. Pacific
coast, including Alaska, there are important differences. The most likely natural disaster
with respect to Pacific coastal areas is an earthquake. Unlike hurricanes, earthquakes give
little, if any, warning with respect to time of occurrence and intensity, thus compromising

a major advantage of a pre-loaded, pre-positioned relief ship, that is, its option of
remaining in port or putting to sea. Aside from a terrorist attack, the kinds of supplies and
equipment and ship capabilities would differ significantly in preparing for a major
hurricane or major earthquake. Casualties from a major earthquake could be on the order
of five to tens greater than that of a major hurricane which would place medical
capabilities of an earthquake relief ship at a premium.
It is not suggested that the relief from the sea concept is not applicable to the Pacific
coast, only that it be developed in the context of the region’s most probable natural
disaster.
*Relief ships should be pre-loaded and pre-positioned at port(s) along the Atlantic and
Gulf coasts during hurricane season (June-November).
*The preferred ship(s) is a RO/RO. Within the
RO/RO class, a shallow draft vessel is preferred
with the capability to offload in a non-port
environment.
*Relief ships should be loaded with a standard
package (supplies and equipment) but with some
flexibility to respond to specific requirements,
i.e. marginal changes in loading would be made
depending on the predicted hurricane intensity
and landfall.
CAPE L CLASS RO-RO
*FEMA should release supplies and equipment from its inland depots, if requested to
augment already loaded equipment and supplies on a pre-positioned relief ship.
*Should state supplies be on a relief ship and that ship responds to a hurricane landfall in
another state, agreements between the states for release of such supplies should be in
place?
*If funds not available for relief from the sea concept, Gulf and Atlantic coast states
could share costs.
*Since state EMD personnel will be the first responders communications between EMD
personnel and a relief ship is a priority requirement.
*With respect to utilizing MSC ships in the RRF in an emergency, it was pointed out that
such ships, by design, are not loaded. If a RRF ship or ships were made available on a
contingency basis, loading time would significantly increase response time (of the ship).
*Maritime Administration presenters made the case for using RRF “Cape L Class”
RO/ROs as relief ships. Two are now home-ported in Wilmington, NC.
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*It was agreed that with pre-planning, ROS time could be reduced from 4-5 days to 2-3
days.
*It was suggested that ship repair capability (shipyards) be included in relief from the sea
pre-planning.
*Various comments and suggestions were made with respect to medical capabilities on a
relief ship. The consensus was against having a dedicated medical relief ship. One
suggestion was having a Military Advanced Surgical Hospital (MASH) capability on
board. After offloading, medical personnel would be flown to the MASH site.
*There was some disagreement with respect to port recovery time should landfall be
made at or near the port. e.g., Hurricane Hugo striking Charleston, SC in 1989. The need
for a port to be operational or partially operational in 48 hours was deemed critical.
With respect to changes in channel depth after a hurricane, it was suggested that a small,
sonar equipped, vessel could lead a relief ship into port. [Ship Operations Cooperative
Program (SOCP) March 7-8, 2006, Jacksonville, FL; Meeting theme “Maritime Forum
for Domestic Disaster Relief.]
*It was suggested that one RRF ship be activated and loaded. The ship would visit
various ports along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts to show the capabilities of the relief from
the sea concept.
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CHAPTER 2
ASSETS, CONCEPTS AND POLICY
The “Hurricane Relief From the Sea” report (November 2005) lists and comments on
available assets and concepts that make relief from the sea a cost effective option when a
hurricane strikes the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf coasts. They are summarized here, together
with an emerging policy with respect to the use of Department of Defense assets in nonmilitary emergencies.
Assets
*The National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), in particular 58 ships in the Ready
Reserve Force (RRF) of which 31 are RO/ROs and of these, 20 are located on the
Atlantic and Gulf coasts in reduced operating status (ROS 5-10). [2] Table 1 lists these
vessels. Table 2 lists the relevant specifications for the different classes of RO/ROs in
ROS status that could be considered as hurricane relief ship candidates.

TABLE 1
CANDIDATE RELIEF FROM THE SEA RO/RO RRF SHIPS
Atlantic Coast
Ship Location

ROS Status

Cape Washington
Cape Wrath

Baltimore
"

5
5

Cape Race
Cape Ray
Cape Rise

Portsmouth, VA
"
"

5
5
5

Cape Lambert
Cape Lobos

Wilmington, NC
"

10
10

Cape Decision
Cape Diamond
Cape Domingo
Cape Douglas
Cape Ducato
Cape Edmont

Charleston, SC
"
"
"
"
"

5
5
5
5
5
5

4

(Days)*

Gulf Coast
Cape Kennedy
Cape Knox

New Orleans, LA
"

5
5

Cape Victory
Cape Vincent

Beaumont, TX
"

5
5

Cape Taylor
Cape Texas
Cape Trinity

Houston, TX
"
"

5
5
5

*ROS (Reduced Operating Status) Figures, e.g., 5, 10 are number of days to be
operational
Source: Department of Defense, U.S. Navy (Military Sealift Command)

CAPE F - LASH
Ships in the RRF are owned and maintained by the U.S. Maritime Administration and
funded from the U.S. Navy National Defense Sealift Fund. When activated, operational
control passes to the Military Sealift Command (MSC).
*Numerous deepwater seaports located along the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf coasts. No
matter where a hurricane makes landfall, a deepwater port is within 24 hours steaming
time (15 knot vessel) of that landfall. [3]
*Major highways and an Inter-Coastal Waterway (ICW) system connecting major ports
along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. e.g., US #17 from Wilmington, NC to Jacksonville,
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FL after which US #1 connects Florida east coast cities from Jacksonville to Key West.
[4]
*A pool of dedicated merchant seamen with many years experience in manning RRF
ships.
*A state of the art Hurricane Center located in Miami, FL. A goal of the U.S. Weather
Bureau Research Program (USWRP) is to reduce hurricane track uncertainty. It follows
that the greater the track certainty, the more effective is the concept of hurricane relief
from the sea.
TABLE 2
SPECIFICATIONS OF RRF RO/RO VESSELS IN ROS
(Atlantic and Gulf Coasts)
Ship.
Class/No

Year(s)
Built

Length
Overall

Speed
Max

Draft
Max

Cargo
Capacity (sq ft.)

Cape D (5)

1972-73

680 ft.

17.1 kts

32 ft.

125,516

Cape E (1)

1971

653 "

17.1 "

32 "

121,400

Cape K (2)

1978-79

696 "

17.6 "

35 "

110,184

Cape L (2)

1972-73

682 "

17.1 "

20 "

56,600

Cape R (3)

1977

648 "

17.6 "

33 "

132,209

Cape V (2)

1984

632 "

15.0 "

28 "

99,942

Cape W (2)

1982

697 "

15.8 "

38 "

221,885

Cape T (3)

1977

634 "

16.7 "

28 "

88,136

Source: Maritime Administration: Ready Reserve Force.
FOS crew size varies from 27 (Cape D) to 30 (Cape L). Fuel consumption at full
operating speed varies from 550 bbls/day (Cape L) to 600 bbls/day (Cape D).
Draft is calculated at summer load line. Cargo capacity is estimated at 75%.
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Concepts
The modern day concept of pre-positioned, pre-loaded ships and ships maintained in a
reduced operating status dates from 1976 when funds were provided to repair/upgrade
and maintain a select group of ships in the NDRF to a point where they could be made
ready for sea in a matter of days rather than weeks or months. A number of World War II
Victory ships as well as some post war built ships formed the nucleus of what would later
become the RRF. [5]
Maintaining a ready reserve force of ships in reduced operating status (not loaded) and a
fleet of (loaded) pre-positioned ships located in the United States and overseas, has
proved its value in both Gulf Wars as well as in non-military emergencies. [6] The case
for a hurricane relief from the sea program is based on these well documented, proven
concepts.
Policy
The original rationale for maintaining a RRF was to provide a quick response sealift
capability in military contingencies. However, as noted in footnote #1, RRF ships have
been activated for non-military emergencies. In the cases of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
non-RRF, MSC controlled naval auxiliaries, also made significant relief contributions in
the days, weeks, and months following landfall. Appendix III of “Hurricane Relief From
the Sea” summarizes these efforts.
The policy of using RRF ships for strictly military contingencies has progressively
evolved into one that recognizes the contribution that DoD assets can make in an
emergency. Recommendation #23 of “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:
Lessons Learned” states:
DoD should revise its Immediate Response
Authority (IRA) policy to allow commanders,
in appropriate circumstances, to exercise IRA
even without a request from local authorities. [7]
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CHAPTER 3
RELIEF FROM THE SEA OPTIONS
Option #1
Activate one (1) “Class L” RO/RO now in ROS-10 located at Wilmington, NC from June
1 to November 30, 2006 (180 days). Return to ROS-10 after hurricane season ends.
Assumption is that the Department of the Navy will downgrade two “Class L” RO/ROs
from RRF to NDRF status and that the ships will be available for relief from the sea
assignments during the 2006 hurricane season.
ROS-10 to FOS

$300,000

to

FOS 180 days ($30,000* x 180)
Return to ROS-10

$500,000
5,400,000

300,000

to

Total

500,000
$6,400,000**

*Includes crew wages, stores, regulatories, e.g. insurance, fuel, lubes, communication
capabilities, misc. voyage repairs, other miscellaneous repairs. [8]
**Does not include cost of relief supplies/equipment.
Comment: Ships ready to load relief supplies 10 days after activation order. Load
capabilities: Various types of wheeled vehicles including tractor-trailers, containers on
trailers, water trucks, fire and police equipment and portable generators. Limited amounts
of diesel fuel from ship’s bunkers available for land transfer as well as limited amounts of
fresh water and power from vessel’s generators.
Sponsoring agency, here assumed to be DHS, will decide whether relief
supplies/equipment will be offloaded, partially offloaded, or remain on ship after
hurricane season.
After hurricane season, sponsoring agency will maintain vessel in ROS-10 for 180 nonhurricane days. Estimated cost is $1.8 million. This cost should be added to options 2-6
as appropriate. [9]
Comment: At the 27 January conference in Charleston it was suggested that a
demonstration relief ship be activated and loaded. The ship would make port calls along
the Atlantic and Gulf coasts to demonstrate a relief from the sea capability. Argued here
is that, for a number of reasons, a single ship would not meet a cost-benefit test in
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providing relief from the sea. If a “demonstration project” is decided upon, there should
be two ships, one on the Atlantic and one on the Gulf coast.
Option #2
Same as option #1 but with additional relief features. Features and costs: [10]
Reverse Osmosis Purification Unit (1)
$ 500,000
Industrial Ice Maker (1)
500,000
Diesel generator (l set)
1,000,000
Additional berthing and messing (30 persons)
500,000
Media center
500,000
Helicopter deck
1,000,000
Sub total

$4,000,000

Activation, deactivation, operating costs

6,400,000

TOTAL

$10,400,000

Comment: Above features can be added individually as preferred which will vary total
cost of package. Assuming complete package as described above and permanently
installed, ship can be ready to load in 120 days from activation order. If time is an
important consideration, certain features can be added in less time and at less cost.
Example: Additional water making capability can be obtained by buying skid mounted
ROPUs and hooking up to ship’s power supply (2 weeks). Accommodations for 7-10
additional personnel can be accomplished during 10-day activation period. Other
temporary capabilities are possible as demonstrated by MSC and RRF ships that
responded to hurricanes Katrina and Rita. See Appendix III, “Hurricane Relief From the
Sea.”
Option #3
Activate two (2) “Class L” RO/ROs. Preload and preposition one ship on the Atlantic
coast and one ship on the Gulf coast. Cost without additional relief features as stated in
Option #2 is $12.8 million. Cost with additional features (complete package) is $20.8
million.
Advantage of two ships of the same class is (1) sharing learning experience, (2)
interchange of crews, if necessary, (3) common repair and maintenance.
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Option #4
The hurricane relief from the sea sponsoring agency, here assumed to be DHS, would
conclude an agreement with DoD to transfer two (2) RRF RO/ROs in ROS-5 or 10 status
to DHS during hurricane season (1 June to 30 November). DHS would assume fiscal
responsibility for the two ships for that six-month period. Ships would be preloaded and
pre-positioned, one on the Atlantic coast, one on the Gulf coast. No additional relief
features as described in option #1 would be added to the vessels. At the end of hurricane
season, ships would be offloaded and returned to MSC control.
ROS 5 or 10 to FOS

$600,000 -

to

FOS 180 days ($30,000 x 180)
Return to ROS 5 or 10 (MSC control)

$1,000,000
10,800,000

600,000 -

Total

to

1,000,000
$12,800,000

Comment: This option is available only if DoD is willing to release ships between 1 June
and 30 November. Risk is that DoD might insist on agreement clause for ships to be
returned in a national emergency. Choice of RO/ROs would be decided by DoD.
Advantage to DHS is that DoD would maintain vessels in ROS 5-10 during six-month
non-hurricane season. Advantage to DoD is reduction in yearly cost to maintain two ships
in ROS status.
Disadvantage to DHS is that DoD requires its ROS/RRF ships to be empty. Prior to
return to DoD, equipment/supplies would have to be offloaded and returned to inland
depots. [11]
Option #5
Pairing two (2) state maritime academy training ships such as the TS State of Maine [12]
with options #3 or #4. Appendix A lists these vessels, their status and capabilities.
Vessels would be maintained in an “as is” status or additional relief ship features
particular to a training ship could be added, but not necessarily those described in option
#1. This option assumes no added relief features as described in option #1.
Cost to bring a training ship to ready for sea status is essentially the
activation/deactivation cost of a “Class L” RO/RO that was estimated at $600,000 –
$1,000,000. Given the periodic active status of these vessels. e.g., training cruises,
$700,000 is the most likely estimate.
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One training ship would be paired with one RO/RO as described in options #3 and #4.
One pair would be home ported on the Atlantic coast, one pair on the Gulf coast.
Comment: Pairing a RO/RO with a training ship would produce a complementary relief
from the sea package. The training ship, with its in place capability to house and feed
large numbers of first responders, and the RO/RO, pre-loaded with supplies and
equipment destined for shore side recovery efforts, would negate the necessity of a single
vessel performing all the tasks required in a relief effort. The RO/ROs primary
responsibility would be to deliver relief supplies/equipment to the impacted area in the
shortest time possible. Command and control centers, media centers, and enhanced
medical capabilities would be tasked to the training ship.
Option #6
Adding the capabilities of two (2) cruise ships to option #5. One ship would be preassigned to the Atlantic coast, one to the Gulf coast. Contracts would be negotiated prior
to the beginning of hurricane season and would terminate at the end of hurricane season.
The decision of whether or not to activate a cruise ship would be that of the sponsoring
agency, presumably DHS.
Comment: Cruise ships provided housing and meals to evacuees and relief personnel in
Katrina’s aftermath, which demonstrated their potential value in the case of a category 45 hurricanes. But also demonstrated was the need for a pre-planned response should
cruise ships again be needed. [13]
Suggested Options Not Considered in Detail
It was generally agreed at the 27 January 2006 Hurricane Relief From the Sea Conference
in Charleston, SC that a RO/RO type vessel was the logical choice as a candidate ship(s)
in a relief from the sea scenario. This chapter is premised on that conclusion. Two other
options have, however, been suggested and are noted here.
One is the inclusion of tug-barge ships in a relief from the sea program. This option was
suggested and discussed at the March 7-8, 2006, meeting in Jacksonville, FL of the Ship
Operations Cooperative Program. Barges would be pre-loaded and pre-positioned at ports
on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. They would either remain in port or put to sea depending
on the predicted hurricane landfall land and its intensity.
Another option that was noted in the Hurricane Relief From the Sea report was to expand
the relief from the sea concept to include the Bahamas and other countries in or bordering
on the Gulf of Mexico or the Caribbean Sea. The preferred ship in this scenario would be
a “Cape F” LASH vessel with its ability to float barges ashore in a non-port environment.
An important qualification, however, is that there must be sufficient offshore water depth
in the hurricane impacted area given that the four RRF LASH ships draw between 35-38
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feet. Presumably this option would be internationally funded. A drawback is that because
there are only four LASH ships in the RRF, DoD would probably be reluctant to have a
LASH pre-loaded and possibly home ported away from the United States.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
In evaluating options with respect to hurricane relief from the sea, the economic concept
of cost-benefit analysis can be helpful. While the concept may seem straightforward, it is
not that simple. While costs can usually be estimated with some precision, benefits, in
many cases, must be measured subjectively.
In the case of option #3, preposition two Class L RO/ROs with additional relief features
on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts at an estimated cost of $20.8 million. This takes care of
the cost side of the equation. The next step is to define “benefit” in such a way that lends
itself, at least partially, to a quantitative interpretation. Here benefit will be defined as
“Relief supplies/equipment delivered where needed in the shortest time possible after a
hurricane makes landfall.” While still subjective, a part of benefit can now be quantified.
That is, the time it takes to reach the disaster area and distribute relief supplies. Thus, 4
days is better than 5, 3 better than 4 and so on.
The next step is to evaluate the relief from the sea option compared to the relief from the
land option in terms of costs and benefits as defined. While the below comparison is
subjective it is based on logic as well as historic data.
Hurricane
Category

Estimated
Time to Reach Disaster
Area and Distribute
Relief Supplies

Benefit Compared to
Cost

By Land

By Sea*

1

<12 hours

<12 hours

Land advantage

2

12-24 hours

12-24 hours

Land advantage

3

24-48 hours

24-48 hours

Equal advantage

4-5

72-120 hours

24-48 hours

Sea advantage

*Relief ship remains in port or returned to port in 48 hours or less. Land option is by road
and air.
Based on the above, the conclusion is that the relief from the sea option generates a
greater benefit in the case of a category 4-5 hurricane; is essentially equal to the land
option in a category 3, and is more costly than the land option in the case of a category 12 hurricane.
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The task now is to assign probabilities to different category hurricanes occurring in a
given hurricane season. If the probability of a category 4-5 hurricane is high, the more
cost effective a hurricane relief from the sea option. If the probability is low, then the
from the land option is the more cost effective.
During the 2005 hurricane season three hurricanes, category 1 or greater, made landfall
on the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Of the three, one had maximum winds of 130 mph,
the upper limit of a category 3. The remaining two had winds of 150 mph. If non-U.S.
landfalls are included, two more hurricanes would be added; one at 100 mph, one at 150
mph. [14]
In the period 1974-2004, 94 hurricanes, category 1 or greater made landfall on the
Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Of these three were category 4-5, 13 were category 3, and the
remaining categories 1-2. [15]
If the year 2005 is used to calculate category probabilities, a strong case can be made in
terms of cost-benefit analysis for option #6, that is, a RO/RO plus a school ship on each
coast in addition to a contingency contract for a cruise ship on each coast. If the 30 year
period 1974-2004 is used, the benefit of the relief from the sea option decreases, that is,
only 18 percent of the reported hurricanes would justify funding an option #5 or #6.
Another economic concept that is useful in evaluating sea and land relief options is
“opportunity cost.” Opportunity cost is the cost of an option in terms of an opportunity
foregone. In the case of relief from the sea, if DHS allocates $20.8 million to buy and
maintain “X” number of trailers to house hurricane evacuees, the opportunity cost of the
$20.8 million is funding, for example, option #3 as described above. [16] In evaluating
the benefit of a relief from the sea package, the importance of understanding the
opportunity cost concept cannot be overstated. Appendix B explains the concept in detail.
At the January 27, 2006, Hurricane Relief From the Sea Conference and the March 7-8,
2006, meeting of the Ship Operations Cooperative Program, an oft-repeated question was
“Where will the funds come from for a relief from the sea option?” The simple answer is
that the money is already there. The requested FY 2006 DHS budget contains $30.6
billion in discretionary funds of which FEMA is allocated $2.63 billion. Thus, the issue is
not funds per se but how to allocate existing funds. Argued here that in terms of
opportunity costs, a strong case can be made for funding option #3. As of the date of this
report, option #3 can be implemented in time for the 2006 hurricane season and option #5
could be in place by 1 September. Examples of support for hurricane relief package can
be found in Appendix C.
In assessing the likelihood of implementing any of the above relief from the sea options,
the odds are not favorable. Unfortunately, the maritime world, its assets and capabilities
are not well understood or appreciated with respect to hurricane relief programs. This can
be no better demonstrated than by a careful reading of the February 2006, “The Federal
Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned” (217 pages). In this respect, Appendix
B, “What Went Right,” cited, among many, the contributions of the Bureau of Prisons,
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the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and the Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service. No mention was made, however, of the unplanned,
ad hoc but very successful, relief contributions made by NDRF and MSC ships. Nor did
Appendix A-Recommendations do much to illuminate the contribution of ships in the
aftermath of Katrina. One hundred twenty-five recommendations were made. Absent
bureaucratic language, recommendation #24 stated “DoD should coordinate with DHS
and DOT to identify DoD’s contingency role in airport operations and evacuations, and
the planning and use of Ready Reserve Fleet vessels for housing, evacuation,
communications, command, control and logistics.” [17]
The chance of those charged with hurricane relief responsibilities –federal, state and local
government officials - of noting and appreciating the above 18 words with respect to the
relief from the sea concept must, indeed, be considered slim to non-existent.
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NOTES
1. Ready Reserve Force ships were activated in the Somalia peacekeeping operation
(1992) in Haiti Operation Democracy (1994), in Operation Desert Storm/Desert
Shield (1990), and Iraqi Freedom (2003). Nine RRF vessels and one NDRF vessel
were activated to support relief efforts following hurricanes Katrina and Rita (2005).
Of these, two were training ships, TS State of Maine and TS Empire State. See also
Appendix III, Hurricane Relief From the Sea.
Ten Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force ships, six Maritime Pre-Positioned ships, and the
hospital ship USNS Mercy rendered assistance in Operation Unified Assistance
(Tsunami, Southeast Asia, 2005). In all, 20 MSC ships participated in Operation
Unified Assistance.
2.

U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration. National Defense
Reserve Fleet Inventory for Month Ending February 28, 2006, pp. 4,7,8 and
Department of Defense, Department of the Navy FSS/LMSR and RRF Surge Sealift
Layberth Locations, p. 1.

3.

Hurricane Relief From the Sea, Figure 1. “U.S. Hurricane Landfalls and Major Port
Cities,” pp. 5-7 and pp. 6-7.

4. Ibid. pp. 7-8.
5. The first no warning test of activating a Ready Reserve Force ship was completed on
16 May 1978, after MSC gave the order to make the SS Pride, a post war built C-3,
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
ROLE OF MARITIME ACADEMY SCHOOL SHIPS IN HURRICANE RELIEF
FROM THE SEA
Seven passenger ships, held in “Retention” status, are part of the Maritime
Administration’s National Defense Reserve Fleet. Four of these are on loan to state
maritime academies for training purposes.
TS Empire State
TS Enterprise
TS Golden Bear
TS State of Maine

New York
Massachusetts
California
Maine

A fifth ship, undergoing repairs/remodeling, will be loaned to the State of Texas as a
school ship. All of the school ships were built between 1962-89.
School ships are titled to the U.S. government. Their operations are funded by the
various states and the federal government. They can be activated for emergency service
by the Secretary, Department of Transportation.
Two school ships, the TS State of Maine and the TS Empire State participated in the
Hurricane Katrina relief effort.
TS State of Maine. Total time to activate 4 days, 20 hours. Arrived New Orleans area
18 September 2005, departed 16 November 2005. Number of days supporting relief
effort 59. Services provided to first responders, evacuees, state and federal agencies:
Meals served
Days sheltered

32,886
Average people 144/day

TS Empire State. Total time to activate 7 days, 1 hour. Arrived New Orleans area 16
September 2005, departed 3 March 2006. Number of days supporting relief effort 163.
Services provided to first responders, evacuees, state and federal agencies:
Meals served
Days sheltered

145,000
Average people 400/day

Sources: Maritime Administration, National Defense Reserve Fleet Inventory For Month
Ending 28 February 2006, and Post Hurricane “KATRINA” and “RITA” Relief Notes.
E-mail correspondence with Captain Wade, 27-28 March.
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EMPIRE STATE

GOLDEN BEAR
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APPENDIX B
OPPORTUNITY COST
“Opportunity cost is a term used in economics to mean the cost of something in terms of
an opportunity foregone (and the benefits that could be received from that opportunity),
or the most valuable forgone alternative.
Opportunity cost need not be assessed in monetary terms, but rather can be assessed in
terms of anything that is of value to the person or persons doing the assessing. The
consideration of opportunity costs is one of the key differences between the concepts of
economic cost and accounting cost. Assessing opportunity costs is fundamental to
assessing the true cost of any course of action. In the case where there is no explicit
accounting or monetary cost (price) attached to a course of action, ignoring opportunity
costs may produce the illusion that its benefits cost nothing at all. The unseen opportunity
costs then become the hidden costs of that course of action,
Note that opportunity cost is not the sum of the available alternatives, but rather of benefit
of the best alternative of them. The opportunity cost of a city’s decision to build a
hospital on its vacant land is the loss of the land for a sporting center, or the inability to
use the land for a parking lot, or the money that could have been made from selling land,
or the loss of any of the various other possible uses—but not all of these in aggregate,
because the land cannot be used for more than one of these purposes.
It is important, as individuals and as societies, to compare the opportunity costs
associated with various courses of action. However, some opportunities may be difficult
to compare along all relevant dimensions.”
Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
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APPENDIX C
TESTIMONIALS AND SUPPORT FOR RELIEF FROM THE SEA CONCEPT
Numerous testimonials have acknowledged and honored the ships and crews that
participated in Hurricanes Katrina and Rita relief efforts. Several of the many dozens are
cited here.
*Hurricane Relief…….Another lesson learned is the dependability of the U.S. Ready
Reserve Force and the civilian crews who serve aboard those vessels. Several ships
braved the storms at dock and provided immediate aide in the form of sanctuary, potable
water, food, fuel and health services to emergency personnel. Other ships returned from
the Gulf after riding out the storms to supply additional assistance.
In the wake of this heroic effort the MTD (Maritime Trades Department, AFL-CIO)
strongly urges officials with the Department of Transportation and the Department of
Homeland Security to initiate a pilot program to be called the Disaster Relief Fleet.
According to the plan, U.S.-flag vessels would be stocked with essential survival and
emergency response materials, then prepositioned along America’s coasts in reserve
operating status. They would be sponsored by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency and fully crewed on short notice to provide immediate response to any disaster
site accessible from the sea. MTD affiliates will work with and support the efforts of the
government to assist in the creation of the Disaster Relief Fleet.
2006 MTD Executive Board Meeting, San Diego, CA February 24-25, 2006.
* * * * * *
*The men and women who crewed and operated these ships provided relief and care to
the Gulf Coast at a critical time, and they have brought great honor and distinction to the
U.S. Merchant Marine. They moved quickly into the stricken area and provided food and
shelter, plus improvising communications strategies, first aid—anything that was needed.
They demonstrated the extraordinary ingenuity of the merchant mariners and the
capability of the maritime industry to respond to a crisis.
John Jamian
Acting Maritime Administrator
* * * * * *
*Ceremony on January 30, 2006, recognizing individuals and organizations for their
relief efforts following Hurricane Katrina. The event was sponsored by the U.S. Maritime
Administration and the Port of New Orleans.
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Individual seamen received certificates of appreciation. The Maritime Administration
also announced approval to award the Merchant Marine Medal For Outstanding
Achievement to the companies and crews that supported relief efforts following
hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
* * * * * *
*WHEREAS, the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) was established under Section
11 of the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 to serve as a reserve of ships for national
defense and national emergency purposes, and the NDRF vessels are now located in the
James River, Virginia, in the Port of Beaumont, Texas, in Suisun Bay, California, and at
designated outported berths; and
WHEREAS, a ready reserve fleet component was established in 1976 as a part of the
NDRF to provide rapid deployment of military equipment later known as the Ready
Reserve Force (RRF), and the NDRF vessels have supported shipping requirements in
seven wars and crisis from the days of the Korean War through operations ENDURING
FREEDOM AND IRAQI FREEDOM contributing significantly to the delivery of
equipment as it applies into the theater of combat operations; and
WHEREAS, the RRF is designed to support military and national emergency operations;
nonetheless, the RRF has stood ready to provide humanitarian assistance to Gulf Coast
Areas following Hurricane Katrina, and was called upon to provide extraordinary
assistance prior to and following the landfall of Hurricane Rita on September 24, 2005.
On September 22, immediately following the ordering of a mandatory evacuation in
Southeast Texas, representatives of the U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime
Administration and Captains of the RRF ships in Beaumont, Texas were requested to
help the City of Beaumont and sister cities in Southeast Texas, together with Jefferson
County, Texas, in providing a safe haven for City and county equipment and material that
would be necessary to support the post-hurricane landfall relief and recovery efforts; and
WHEREAS, following the landfall of Hurricane Rita, the RRF ships, Cape Victory and
Cape Vincent, became home to the City of Beaumont personnel as well continuing to
provide a safe haven for its equipment; and
WHEREAS, without the unwavering support of the Maritime Administration and the
heroic actions of the Captains and crews of its RRF ships, the Cape Victory and Cape
Vincent, the hurricane recovery efforts in Southeast Texas would have been significantly
prolonged;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Guy N. Goodson, Mayor of the City of Beaumont, do hereby
proclaim Tuesday, January 31, 2006 as “MARITIME ADMINISTRATION READY
RESERVE FLEET DAY” in Beaumont, and provide special thanks to John Jamain,
Deputy Maritime Administrator of the Maritime Administration, for the humanitarian
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assistance provided to the City of Beaumont, Texas, by the Maritime Administration and
its RRF ships, the Cape Victory and Cape Vincent, and their extraordinary Captains and
crews.
ACCORDINGLY, the Mayor has
hereunto set his hand and caused
the Seal of the City of Beaumont
to be affixed.
Guy N. Goodson
MAYOR
January 31, 2006
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